This paper presents a model of the evolution of the hedonic utility function in which perception is imperfect. Netzer (2009) considers a model with perfect perception and finds that the optimal utility function allocates marginal utility where decisions are made frequently. This paper shows that it is also beneficial to allocate marginal utility away from more perceptible events. The introduction of perceptual errors can lead to qualitatively different utility functions, such as discontinuous functions with flat regions rather than continuous and strictly increasing functions.
Introduction
Based on the hypothesis that individual decisions are guided by hedonic utility, several recent studies have found an evolutionary foundation for S-shaped utility functions. Though they use different mechanisms, Netzer (2009) and Rayo and Becker (2007) are two notable examples.
1 Netzer (2009) derives a utility function which is steep in regions where decisions have to be made frequently, and where wrong decisions would lead to large losses. Rayo and Becker (2007) consider the case of an individual with local information, bounded utility and limited perception to derive S -shaped utility functions that spread incentives over the output domain.
Besides advancing our understanding of happiness as a tool for decision making, these recent contributions are also linked to risk preferences.
Because of this link, and the possibility of an evolutionary foundation of the S -shape, the debate is followed by both proponents and detractors of prospect theory. 
The environment
The environment is based on Netzer (2009) , though the original setup can be traced back at least to Robson (2001) . Suppose that an agent makes repeated choices between two options, x and y. These options are independently drawn from a normalized set, [0, 1], according to a distribution function F with full support. The options are identified with fitness levels: option x yields fitness x, where fitness could simply be thought of as the number of offspring.
The agent has a hedonic utility function U (x), which is shaped by natural selection. Naturally, the agent will choose the option that makes her happier. Because evolution, through natural selection, optimizes the utility function, I will use the common metaphor of a gene that maximizes offspring. Thus, the "selfish gene" will design the utility function that promises the largest expected fitness.
3
However, not all utility functions are admissible. Besides focusing on measurable utility functions, there will be two constraints. First, the human brain has a limited size. Thus, happiness must be bounded. Second, the human senses are imperfect. Thus, happiness cannot be perceived without errors. 4 More formally, I will make the following assumptions.
Assumption 1 (Bounded happiness). Without loss of generality, the utility function must be bounded between 0 and 1.
Assumption 2 (Limited perception). The agent will perceive the happiness of x as U (x) + ε, where the error ε is a random variable.
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These assumptions are are based in Rayo and Becker (2007) with some technical differences, the most important of which is the additive noise. Rayo and Becker (2007) model limited perception as an agent that cannot distinguish outcomes within intervals-similar to Netzer (2009).
The difference with Netzer (2009)
Assumption 2 deserves further discussion because it is the main variation from Netzer (2009) . In his paper, Netzer models limited perception "by assuming that utility can take only discrete, albeit extremely numerous, values. [...] The set of admissible utility functions is thus restricted to the set of increasing step functions with N ∈ N jumps, each corresponding to a utility increment of size 1/N . As a result, the agent cannot distinguish two alternatives located on the same step of the utility function. Any choice between such alternatives will have to be random, and a mistake can occur."
3 See Dawkins (1976) . I assume that the utility function values offspring. See Rayo and Robson (2014) for a theory on the evolution of utility functions over intermediate goods such as food, shelter, etc.
4 See Rayo and Becker (2007) or Netzer (2009) for further motivation. 5 Note that limited perception of happiness is different from limited perception of the alternatives. If the x is perceived with a noise, then evolution will operate on the senses needed to distinguish one alternative from another. In this model, however, we are interested in the consequences of perceiving utility U (x) with noise.
To derive his main result, Netzer takes the limit when N → ∞, so perception becomes perfect. Netzer takes this elegant approach because, with finite N , the optimization problem becomes intractable. In this way, Netzer finds a solution with a clear interpretation; the perfect perception solution is the limit of a series of solutions with limited perception. In fact, Corollary 3 below can be interpreted as a proof of the robustness of Netzer's result.
However, by maintaining limited perception we can focus on the issues that we miss by taking the limit. The upshot is that in theory the omissions may be considerable. On the other hand, what we lose in the approximation we gain in tractability. As we shall see, with limited perception the existence of an analytic solution is not guaranteed.
The gene's problem
With limited perception, the agent gets confused. She will choose x over y if and only if U (x) + ε 0 ≥ U (y) + ε 1 , where the errors are iid and share the spirit of a discrete choice model (McFadden, 1974) .
6 With a slight abuse of notation, let ε ≡ ε 0 − ε 1 and call G the distribution of ε. Note that ε is symmetric by construction. 7 Then, the agent chooses x over y if and only if U (x) − U (y) ≥ ε with x, y ∼ F and ε ∼ G, all independent. Assume that the distributions can be represented by bounded densities f and g with finitely many discontinuities. In Section 8, I explore the possibility of multiplicative errors and its connection to Weber's Law.
The agent chooses x with probability
. Let V represent the "expected fitness"
6 Notice also a similarity with the drift-diffusion model of decision making (Fehr and Rangel, 2011) .
given a utility function U . Thus,
Therefore, the gene's problem becomes
where U is the set of admissible functions, which I assume is the set of measurable functions bounded between 0 and 1.
Remark. The function U appears twice inside the integral with different running variables. Intuitively, any change of U at any point must be weighted versus the whole function. Thus, this problem is not local.
In a sense, this framework is a generalization of Netzer's. Netzer (2009) assumes that ε 0 = 0 and restricts the set of admissible utility functions to a specific set of step functions.
Yet in another sense, both this paper and Netzer (2009) are particular cases of a more general framework, namely, where the errors ε 0 (x) are functions of outcomes. In this sense, a step function U step , such as those admissible in Netzer (2009) , can be understood as a utility function with an error that depends on the outcome: U step (x) = U (x) + ε 0 (x). This paper, then, "unpacks" the U step by allowing for a stochastic shock ε 0 , which doesn't depend on x, and any measurable U (x).
A simple example
Before proceeding with the formal analysis, this section introduces a simple example that overturns the intuition of allocating more marginal utility where decisions have to be made more frequently.
Suppose that errors are uniform
Outcomes X have a pdf denoted by f . In this case:
After simplifications,
This implies that the optimal utility function U * should be an indicator
Note that this is optimal regardless of f . In fact, the optimal utility allocates all the marginal utility at sult when the pdf is a Beta(0.5, 0.5), which allocates more mass at the extremes. The optimal utility function is a step function, essentially flat almost everywhere. However, even though f (1/2) is the minimum of f , U * has infinite marginal utility at x = 1/2. The intuition of Netzer is overturned because, once we allow for errors, the optimization problem becomes non-local. One has to weight the local marginal utility against the marginal utility evaluated at every point. In other words, mistakes are not only made for alternatives with similar fitness, but also when comparing alternatives with very different fitness and therefore the optimal solution is not only determined by the local density, but by the global probability function.
Granted, this example is extreme because the errors are big. However, as we will see, this intuition holds true for any size of the errors. Indeed, as long as there is limited perception, there will be flat regions in the utility 
Existence and uniqueness
The first step to tackle this problem is to assure existence and uniqueness of a solution. As is, we can not apply an existence theorem for the set U because it is not compact. But we can prove the theorem for a subset of U: the subset of monotone functions.
In Appendix A, Lemma 2 shows that if a solution exists, it must be monotone, non-decreasing. Therefore, we can restrict our search. Let M ⊂ U denote the set of admissible monotone functions:
And note that M is closed, bounded and convex. From here, we can 
2/3 dx, where f is the pdf of X and c is a normalizing constant. Since the optimal utility function is not defined if f (x) = 0, I will formally assume full support, except perhaps at the extremes. Proof. I will prove that the maximum is attained. Note that M is sequentially compact (Helly's First Theorem (Montesinos, Zizler and Zizler, 2015) ). Also note that V is sequentially continuous, ie, if U n → U , then
. To see this, note that G ≤ 1 so that V is bounded and, by V attains a maximum in M.
To prove uniqueness, note that V [U ] can be written as
Here, we can see
. Then, V is concave and the maximum is unique.
The optimal utility function
Since the optimization problem is non-local, general properties of the solution are hard to characterize. Indeed, if we take the approach of calculus of variations we end up with an integral equation, which in general does not have analytic solutions. However, we can prove a few properties. In particular, there will be flat regions in the utility function.
Proposition 2. Let U be the utility function that solves
Then, U has the following form:
It is a well known result that if a space X is sequentially compact, and if a function f is sequentially continuous, then f achieves a maximum in X. For completeness, here is a proof:
then U is continuous. Moreover, if G is strictly concave in [0, ∞), then u is differentiable, and hence U is differentiable almost everywhere.
Proof. Let us begin by writing the Lagrangian:
The Karush-Kuhn-Tucker conditions are:
In the jargon of Calculus of Variations 9 , for U * to solve (1), we need that the variation of L equals zero along U * , in other words, the First Order
Condition is δL = 0. The variation δL is defined as:
where δU ∈ U is some admissible perturbation, close enough to U such that U + αδU ∈ U for all α sufficiently close to 0.
I will start with δV and then continue with the rest of δL. get the following expression:
dy.
Define the interior integral as I(y), which is a function of y. Then,
Now, we focus on the second part of δL.
we get that:
Since, δL = 0 should hold for any arbitrary (but close) deviation δU , subject to some regularity conditions, we can apply the Fundamental Theorem of Calculus of Variations to conclude that the First Order Condition
Therefore,
The following lemma establishes that I is in fact continuous. Its proof is in Appendix B. Also note that
It follows that for any U ∈ M, if f (0) > 0, then I(0) < 0 and if f (0) = 0, then I(0) = 0 and, by assumption, U (0) = 0. But in both cases, for a small enough a > 0, we conclude that I(a) < 0. Therefore, U (a) = 0. By
The case of I(1) = 2f (1)
ogous so that I(b) > 0 for b close enough to 1. Again, by monotonicity,
Define u ≡ U for x ∈ (a, b).
To prove that u is continuous, consider u(c) for an arbitrary c ∈ (a, b)
and let u(c − ) be its limit from the left and u(c + ) from the right. By assumption, I(c) = 0 must hold, then
which implies that u(c − ) = u(c + ) (when g is not flat). Thus, u is continuous.
To prove that U is continuous when a < b, define u(a) ≡ lim x→a + u(x).
Because I(x) is continuous,
which implies that u(a) = 0. The case for u(b) is analogous.
Finally, to prove that u is differentiable, fix a c ∈ (a, b) and consider the following function:
Note that What is special about the edges? Intuitively, since the utility at the extremes is extreme, the event of a high x versus a low y is easy to decide for the agent. However, the case of high x versus medium y is more difficult.
To solve this, the gene builds perception in the case of high x versus medium y by compromising perception in the case of high x versus high y. This results in a robust strategy: when errors are big, optimize behavior by having extreme utility in regions where losses and rewards are high.
The following corollary gives us a sense of what happens in the limit case of perfect perception, in which case, Netzer's result is optimal and the utility function has no flat regions.
Corollary 3. Suppose that the errors ε ∼ N (0, σ 2 ). Then, when σ 2 → 0, there are no flat regions in the optimal utility function. In particular,
Netzer's result is optimal, as is any strictly increasing function.
Proof. Given σ 2 , choose a small enough a > 0 such that I(a) < 0. In this case:
when σ 2 → 0. The case for I(b) > 0 is analogous.
As mentioned before, the non-locality of the integral equation makes any further analysis complicated. In particular, the integral equation may not be solved by Picard iterations (cf. Montesinos, Zizler and Zizler (2015) ).
However, a few results can be proven in the next set of corollaries.
Proofs can be found in Appendix D. 
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Second, when the variance of the outcomes x increases, the flat areas of the utility function expand. Similarly to larger errors, with larger volatility, the utilty function must also become volatile to compensate.
Corollary 5. Suppose that the error ε has a pdf g and that outcomes y ∼ Beta(α, α). Then, as α increases, a increases and b decreases. That is, as the variance of the outcomes decreases, the flat areas of the utility function expand.
Finally, as the expected outcome x increases, the utility function shifts to the right to accommodate a better environment.
Corollary 6. Suppose that the error ε has a pdf g and that outcomes y ∼ Beta(α, β). Then, as α increases, both a and b increase. That is, as 11 I used Knitro, via Matlab, to solve a discrete version of the optimization problem. The codes are available upon request or at home.uchicago.edu/ jtudon. 
Concluding remarks
The numerical and analytical results suggest that, when errors are large, the marginal utility gets concentrated around the mean, as in Figures 3 and 4. On the other hand, the intuition for robustness holds: with limited perception, the robust approach pushes to distinguish relatively bad outcomes from good ones. On the multiplicative errors, note the connection with the Psychophysical Law of Weber and Fechner, which states that noticeable differences between two stimuli are proportional to the magnitude of the stimuli.
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In fact, " [Fechner] argued that the sensation function is logarithmic since equal relative changes in the stimuli brought about equal absolute changes in sensation" (Sinn, 2003) .
Back to this paper, instead of additive errors, suppose that the utility function U is shocked with a proportional (multiplicative) error so that
x is selected over y iff U (x)ε x ≥ U (y)ε y . Then, taking logs and renaming U ≡ ln U , we get that x is chosen iff U (x)−U (y) ≥ ε ≡ ln(ε y /ε x ). Assuming that these expressions make (technical) sense, it can be shown that the results hold with minor rescaling. Because this is a model of cardinal utility functions, Weber's Law is mathematically equivalent to the present model.
As a final thought, let us think about extrapolating the resulting utility function to an environment with risk where the agent faces lotteries: for
would be the lottery of getting x with probability p and getting y with probability q. There is a problem.
Netzer (2009) can be separated into a utility function and a probability weighting function, such utility function will likely be different from the optimal utility function of the environment without risk. Herold and Netzer (2015) deal precisely with this problem as they explore the possibility that the gene chooses a probability weighting function given that the utility function is S-shaped. In this sense, prospect theory functions evolved as a series of kludges (Ely, 2011) .
13 All in all, we have to be cautious of extrapolating our result to a risky environment.
Having said that, this paper makes us aware of the costs and benefits of assuming limited perception. To be sure, Rayo and Becker (2007) already derive S-shaped utility functions. However they do so by imbuing the agent with local information that the principal would find relevant. By contrast, in this paper, the S-shape is sustained only with bounded utility and limited information. Moreover, the S-shape will have flat regions precisely because information is limited.
A Lemma 2
Lemma 2. For any U ∈ U exists a monotone, non-decreasing function
Proof. This proof is not as trivial as it seems, since changing U at any point will change the whole integral. The strategy will be to consider simple functions first, and then apply the dominated convergence theorem to prove the general case.
The objective function can be written as:
Suppose that U n is a simple function that is constant on the intervals takes on the sth interval. From this definition we see that each n-vector corresponds to a step function.
We will now define the sorting operator S acting on the vector u as follows. Let l be an integer in 1, . . . , n such that u l > u m for some l < m.
If l exists, set S(u) to be the n-vector with u m on the lth position and u l on the mth position, and all other elements equal to the corresponding elements of u. If such an l does not exist, set S(u) = u. Then, S sorts two elements of u in increasing order.
14 Similarly, let x n and f n be two simple functions; the idea is that x n → x and f n → f . With a slight abuse of notation, also let x n and f n stand for the n-vectors with x s and f s in the sth position. Therefore, we can
In Appendix B, I prove the following lemma.
14 For example: if u = (5 2 3) ⇒ S(u) = (2 5 3).
Therefore, if we apply the sorting operator S sufficiently many times to U n , to a maximum of n times, we find the rearranged vector U * n : a vector completely sorted in ascending order. Every application of the sorting operator S improves V n , and since we apply it a finite number of times
Now that this holds for simple functions, we go for the general case.
Since f , U and the identity are measurable functions, there are sequences of bounded simple functions {f n }, {U n } and {x n } converging almost everywhere to f , U and x. Define the increasing rearrangement of U as
This rearrangement always exists; it is like sorting the values of U in increasing order. This is a quantile function.
From this definition, U n → U a.e. implies that the rearrangements also converge a.e. to the rearrangement: U * n → U * a.e. (see Chernozhukov, Fernández-Val and Galichon (2009) and the references therein). Moreover,
and, since the inequality works for every n, by Lebesgue's dominated convergence theorem,
B Proofs
Proof of Lemma 3. Consider the following expression:
Next, for i = l, there are j = 1, . . . , l summands and for i = m, there are j = 1, . . . , m summands. Similarly, for j = l, there are i = l, . . . , n summands and for j = m, there are i = m, . . . , n summands. However, we are double-counting 3 summands, but 2 are zero: The non-zero summand corresponds to j = l and i = m. Finally, note that
At this point, use the definition of S and conclude that the preceding sum equals:
By assumption u l > u m . Moreover, G is a non-decreasing cdf and
On the other hand,
, which implies that
Therefore we conclude that V n [U n ] − V n [S(U n )] ≤ 0.
Proof of Lemma 1. Define h y (x) ≡ 2(y − x)f (x)f (y)g (U (y) − U (x)) so that I(y) = 
C Second order conditions

